Friday, February 27, 2009
Peak Pitch 2009
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
License vs Manufacturing In House vs Contract Manufacturing
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Classmates, Facebook and Marketing Myopia
Friday, February 20, 2009
Themes from the PA Trip Part 2
I spent a good bit of time in the last post covering capital; capital requirements, raising capital etc. Let’s begin this post by covering one last topic related to capital. A few of the companies I met with asked about agents. They had been approached by groups or individuals claiming the ability to raise money from angels and VCs and they wanted to know my thoughts. I should say that since we shut down our fund, I have been approached by no less than a dozen entrepreneurs looking for help raising money. There must be a nasty rumor floating around that I can raise money. I find this very funny and I’m sure my former partners would as well. The empirical evidence suggests that my money raising skills are far from noteworthy. If my skills were worthy of note, we would have successfully navigated the admittedly troubled waters and actually finished our raise. So, to answer their question, if you are approached by an agent claiming access to capital, approach them with caution. My experience has shown that those claiming to be able to raise money seldom can. The ones that can are too busy raising money to waste their time with cold outreach.
Most of the CEOs had yet to settle on a revenue model. Many frankly hadn’t thought through precisely how they planned to make money. I have always believed that emerging businesses should constantly challenge their business model, benchmarking off of other businesses with similar characteristics. I know that some investors get upset when the revenue model they invested in changes dramatically. Frankly, I think that kind of thinking is myopic and just flat wrong. An emerging business may change their model half a dozen times or more before figuring out how not to leave money on the table.
VCs see hundreds if not thousands of plans each year. As such, we have typically seen dozens of plans covering any given space. The sheer number of businesses seen gives us perspective and allows us to assess where a business lies in the value chain and if they are positioned correctly. This of course, doesn't make us right but we usually have seen enough similar offerings to at least have an educated oppinion. This topic is probably best left for another day as it really should at least be a solo post and perhaps a series of posts. So, I will leave it at this; emerging businesses should evaluate their position in the value chain and attempt to assess if that position is aligned with core competencies. Several of the firms in PA probably should take a swim upstream/downstream to fully realize their potential.
The final observation I’d like to cover related to my PA trip has to do with angel groups and the not so recent trend for them to attempt to be VCs. Angels in general, should leave the heavily structured term sheets and milestoned investments to the professionals. The angel organization that tries to mimic the process and criteria of a VC is creating a dangerous precedent. Don't get me wrong. Angels form a vital piece of the ecosystem and they tend to good people looking to impact their community in a profound way; but they don't do this professionally. I made the analogy during one of my meetings that an angel trying to be a VC is akin to someone trying to count cards in a six deck shoe. You are better off playing it straight unless you are really good at it and there are probably less than 200 people on the planet that can accurately keep a count on a six deck shoe.
Themes from the PA trip Part 1
As I mentioned in my first post, I just completed a quick consulting engagement in PA. Some of the regional economic development folks arranged for me to come in and sit down with CEOs of early stage businesses, economic development leaders and the service professionals that round out the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Over the course of three days, I met individually with 10-12 CEOs. My mandate was fairly ambiguous so I made it a point to lay out expectations and goals at the onset of each hour long session. Their objectives ranged from assessment of business model and VC fundability to pitch deck evaluation. Many simply wanted to know if they pass the sniff test. Over the course of these sessions, a few themes emerged that I will speak to over the course of a few blog posts.
With the exception of two, each CEO was simply not asking for enough money. Their asks ranged from $50,000 to about $250,000. In the current market environment, characterized by extremely tight credit markets, tumbling home values, a stock market that can't seem to find a bottom, a dead IPO market and a dearth of M&A activity (read, no exits for VC-backed companies and no liquidity for LPs) early stage technology companies need working capital. Remember, cash, or more specifically, the lack there of, kills emerging businesses. I suggest having enough cash to cover your current/expected burn for 18 months. Theme number 1, entrepreneurs aren't aware of their capital requirements. It seems many entrepreneurs believe that asking for $50,o00-$250,000 improves their chances of finding an investor. The reality is that asking for $50k is like asking for $10M. In either case, you are catering to the margin. There simply aren't many sophisticated investors willing to look at a deal of that size. The other reason for asking for such a small sum is the hesitance to give up ownership. The reality is that these ventures, with few exceptions, had very little chance of succeeding without significant operational assistance. They need hands on board members with operational experience. At the end of the day they have to ask themselves the following: would you rather have 100% of a grape or 50% of a watermellon?
Just like in the public equity markets, there is natural flight to quality in the private equity world. Many funds that were raising didn’t get it done and have since shut down. I can think of one in particular. Others are suffering with defaulting LPs not meeting capital calls. Still others have changed their going forward strategies. For example, a fund that had planned to invest in say 4 or 5 new companies may instead choose to reserve those funds for follow-ons with existing portfolio companies. Those portfolio companies will likely struggle to bring in "new money" so existing investors will be forced to shoulder the load. So, what does this all mean? Well, there is very little money available. Those with capital are in the drivers seat and can afford to be very picky. As such, only the best of the best will find smart money in this market. We're talking serial entrepreneurs with prior exits, with novel, defensible technologies in markets exhibiting venture economics. If your offering lacks any of these traits I would suggest bootstrapping.
If it takes 3-6 months to raise money in a traditional market, it can easily take twice as long today. If you are able, I would suggest focusing on your business instead of on fundraising. Fundraising is a full time job for a CEO and few businesses can afford to have the leader spend their time away from their primary function. Theme number 2, unless you have an A+ offering and you need the money, focus your attention on your business rather than fundraising.
I'm just getting started here. Stay tuned with more thoughts from my PA adventure.
Introduction
Intro
Is there anybody out there…………..
You can track her life experience beginning with her very early arrival at 1 lb 5 ½ ounces through the present time. In the early goings, I updated the blog every day or so. In the last several months I have been less diligent.
Back to the intent of this blog. I don’t have the traditional VC pedigree, at least as it relates to educational background. My undergraduate degree is from Lehigh and my MBA is from the
About two years ago, two partners and I began the process of raising an early stage fund. We did the market research to pull together the investment thesis and story. We wrote the PPM, pitch deck and accompanying materials and went to market. Although we gained some traction in the investor and entrepreneurial communities, we hit a brick wall in the fall and decided to shut it down.
I'll add a few posts in the next day or so related to a trip I made to Pennsylvania where I worked with economic development groups, CEOs of emerging businesses, incubators, investors and service providers to build a comprehensive program; a program that will attempt to expedite the transition of a traditional industrial/manufacturing economy to one based on innovation, commercialization and entrepreneurialism.